

Sino-Japanese Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Period

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Abstract

To maintain its policy of national isolation during the Edo period, Japan restricted contact with the outside world to Dutch merchant ships and Chinese junks at the Japanese port of Nagasaki. Sino-Japanese interaction consisted not only of trade in goods, but also of cultural and scholarly exchanges. This paper will examine how this unofficial trade affected both Japan and China from a cultural perspective.

Key words: Edo period, Junk, Sino-Japanese interaction, Nagasaki, Zhapu

During the Edo era, cultural interaction between Japan and China was affected by the Tokugawa bakufu's policy of national isolation, which prevented Japanese from sailing to China. For the most part, this was an era in which Sino-Japanese interaction was maintained through the arrival of vessels from China to Nagasaki. For this reason, Chinese sailing vessels (junks), called *Tōsen* by the people of Edo, were a major channel of cultural trade between China and Japan.

The term *Tōsen* 唐船 derives from the word that people in the Edo era generally used for China, *Tō* meaning the Tang dynasty. Similarly, the Chinese who sailed to Japan were called *Tōjin* (唐人 people of Tang). Chinese were already aware by the end of the Ming dynasty that China was called *Tō* in Japan. In the fifth year of Tianqi (1625), Nan Juyi, the governor (*xunfu* 巡撫) of Fujian, reported to the Tianqi emperor on Chinese junks. The 58th volume of the *Xizong shilu* (熹宗實錄 Authentic Records of Xizong), for the first day of the fourth month of the fifth year of Tianqi, records the following:

The governor of Fujian, Nan Juyi, wrote that people on land and sea use the ocean as rice fields: the powerful use it for trade, buying and selling

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in Japan and Europe; officials use it to extract fees; moreover, countries with armies use it to divide wealth. None of this is forbidden. How could we know that merchant junks would go to Japan and other countries? . . . I've heard that people from Fujian, Suzhou, and Zhejiang live in the Japanese archipelago. I don't know how many hundreds or thousands of families are there. Or how many have married Japanese, and have sons and grandsons. They call the locale Tang City. These hundreds or thousands of clans, and the families of the married couples, are aware of who is secretly taking part in this trade. Many people are involved. The junks that frequent the port are called Tang junks. All the big ones carry goods from China, which they sell directly to the Japanese or through joint ventures with the Japanese.

At the beginning of the Ming dynasty (1368), the court adopted a policy of gradually restricting sea trade, but this policy was relaxed from the latter half of the sixteenth century, after which the number of merchant junks clandestinely sailing to Japan increased. Thus, even before the Tokugawa bakufu was established, the Chinese and Japanese had already established a trade in culture through Chinese shipping.

The Tokugawa bakufu prohibited Japanese commoners from engaging in trade abroad to restrict access to foreign countries. Active relations with foreign countries was limited to the Satsuma clan for relations with the Ryukyu Islands and to the Sō clan of Tsushima for relations with the Korean court. In relations between Japan and Holland and between Japan and China, via Nagasaki, the focus was on trade. Though China typically required tributary status of its neighbors, Japan was able to maintain a continuous trade relationship with the Ming and Qing courts on an equitable basis. Throughout most of the Edo era, Sino-Japanese cultural interaction took the remarkable form of cultural exchange via Chinese merchant ships and junks arriving in Nagasaki. In this paper I will examine the role of the Chinese junks that frequented the port of Nagasaki in cultivating an environment for Sino-Japanese cultural interaction.

Review of Research on Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction in the Edo Era

Research on Sino-Japanese cultural interaction in the Edo era dates back to eight issues of *Shigaku zasshi* (25, no. 2 [February 1914] to 26, no. 2 [February 1915]), when Nakamura Kyūshirō (Nakayama Kyūshirō) published the paper “Kinsei Shina no Nihon bunka ni oyoboshitaru seiryoku eikyō”(The Powerful Influence Exerted by Premodern China on Japanese Culture). In this seminal work Nakamura considered Sino-Japanese cultural relations from a

variety of perspectives: Confucianism, history, literature, linguistics, art, religion, medicine, natural history, receptivity to new Western learning, Chinese political law, Japanese and Chinese manufactures, food and drink, music, martial arts, customs, and games. He emphasized the need to use a variety of theories to study the influence on Japan of the Qing dynasty, which had collapsed just two years earlier. Nakamura concluded, “The influence of premodern China on Japan is exceedingly great and hardly inferior to that of Tang dynasty documents.”¹ Nakamura thus stressed the importance of Ming and Qing culture for Edo Japan.

Nakamura’s research was followed by the work of Yano Jin’ichi, who approached cultural exchange from the perspective of trade with Nagasaki. In the early summer of 1923 Yano was asked to compile a history of Nagasaki, and in the following year he gave the lecture “Shina no kiroku yori mitaru Nagasaki bōeki ni tsuite”(On Trade with Nagasaki as Seen in Chinese Annals).² In 1925 Yano published his first paper, “Shina no kiroku kara mita Nagasaki no bōeki”(Nagasaki Trade As Seen in Chinese Annals). The opening paragraph of Yano’s paper states,

The role of Nagasaki in trade resembles that played by the only foreign port in China: Canton. When we compare the influence of overseas trade at Nagasaki with that of Canton, however, we can see that trade via Nagasaki cannot be put into the same category. The influence from abroad on Japan through the port of Nagasaki is far greater, indicating just how different in scale are the cultures of China and Japan.³

He concludes,

When we speak of foreign trade at Nagasaki, we are really talking only about Dutch-Japanese and Sino-Japanese trade. Sino-Japanese trade was especially important. Vessels trading between Japan and Holland were large, and their cargoes were great, but the number of Dutch ships was far fewer, and such trading vessels visited the port of Nagasaki only once a year. The frequency cannot compare with Chinese junks, which arrived at the Japanese port three times a year—in the spring, summer, and autumn.⁴

As Yano points out, the amount of Chinese trade was two to three times that

1 Nakamura, *Shigaku zasshi* 26, no. 2 (February 1915), p. 4.

2 A talk given at the meeting of the Shigaku Kenkyūkai (Society of Historical Research), June 14, 1914. Noted in *Shirin* 9, no. 4 (October 1924): 149–150.

3 *Nagasaki-shi shi* (The History of Nagasaki), p. 462.

4 *Nagasaki-shi shi*, p. 463.

of the Dutch, a fact that underscores the influence of Chinese trade on Japan.

Thereafter, Yano continued his research of premodern Chinese history in conjunction with research on Chinese trade with Nagasaki, and he published the results in *Nagasaki-shi shi* (The History of Nagasaki City) in November 1938. In the preface to his history Yano states,

Simply narrating the trajectory of trade development is insufficient to describe the history of Nagasaki trade. The passage of trade via the gateway of Nagasaki has exerted an immeasurable influence on the culture of our country through the influx of culture from China. This has greatly helped in the development of our own culture. The impact of imports of Chinese textiles and silk thread has been tremendous, contributing greatly to the development of our country's silk industry. The important issues of cultural and industrial history must be examined through the data on Nagasaki trade.⁵

In his history Yano proposed that areas he did not cover be researched in the future. Yet even now after nearly eighty years have passed, we still cannot say that the issues he raised have been sufficiently resolved.

Research in this field was subsequently published by Yamawaki Teijirō in his *Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki* (Chinese Trade with Nagasaki, 1964). The field was further developed in new directions by Ōba Osamu in his *Edo jidai ni okeru Tōsen mochiwatashisho no kenkyū* (Research on Chinese Trading Vessel Cargo Lists in the Edo Era, 1967), and *Edo jidai ni okeru Chūgoku bunka juyō no kenkyū* (Research on Receptivity to Chinese Culture in the Edo Era, 1984). Research on Nagasaki trade from a Japanese perspective was subsequently published by Nakamura Tadashi in *Kinsei Nagasaki bōeki shi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of Trade at Nagasaki, 1988), and by Ōta Katsunari in *Sakoku jidai Nagasaki bōeki shi no kenkyū* (Research on Nagasaki Trade during the Period of National Isolation, 1992). Research providing details about the Chinese side of the trade include Matsuura Akira's *Shindai kaigai bōeki shi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of Overseas Trade during the Qing Era, 2002). Yet the cultural aspects of Sino-Japanese trade, research first proposed by Nakamura Kyūshirō in his 1915 magnum opus, continues to be widely overlooked.

Sino-Japanese Commercial Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Era

During the Kan'ei period (1624–1643), when the Tokugawa bakufu enacted the policy of national isolation, Chinese junks that had heretofore

5 *Nagasaki-shi shi*, preface, p. 5.

visited several ports in Kyushu were now restricted to the port of Nagasaki.

From the first half of the seventeenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century (the end of the Ming era through the beginning of the Qing era), Chinese junks that frequented Nagasaki sailed from nearly the entire length of the Chinese coast to Southeast Asia. In addition, trade was also carried out by the Qing court and by Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga, 1624–1662), who used Taiwan as a base to support the collapsing Ming government. In 1683 Chenggong's grandson, Zheng Keshuang, still based in Taiwan, surrendered to the Qing government. The following year the Qing court issued an edict for development of the seas (Zhanhai Ling 展海令), which lifted the ban against maritime shipping. Consequently, there was a sudden increase in the number of trading junks visiting the port of Nagasaki from the coastal regions of China, and in particular from the Yangtze River Delta and the Jiangnan region. Examples of trading ships from that era are the Ningbo junks numbered 84 and 85, which arrived in Nagasaki in October 1685. These two Ningbo junks originally were based in Zhangzhou, Fujian. It is quite possible that because there were not enough sailors or cargo to go to Japan, the merchants trading in Zhangzhou went north to Ningbo, where they procured goods for Japan before sailing to Nagasaki:

For our junks there is a shortage of transport goods from Zhangzhou in our country, so we are petitioning for goods to be sent. This spring they will be coming from Zhangzhou to Zhejiang and Ningbo. For some time we have been asking for goods for shipping abroad, and are petitioning again for some now.⁶

From the above, it is clear that when the ban was lifted on shipping, many merchants desired to trade with Japan, but there was a shortage of commodities to trade.

Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki every year. The ships arriving to conduct trade were numbered chronologically according to the Chinese sexa-

Table 1. The arrival of 194 Chinese junks in Nagasaki in 1687 by month and the number of their crew members

	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Total
Junks	6	7	20	98	41	15	4	3	194
%	3.1	3.6	10.3	50.5	21.2	7.7	2.1	1.5	100
Crew	246	291	946	4,432	2,037	894	225	220	9,291
%	2.6	3.2	10.2	47.7	21.9	9.6	2.4	2.4	100

⁶ *Kai hentai* (Chinese Metamorphosis), vol. 1, p. 536.

genary cycle. The number of Chinese junks that visited Nagasaki in 1688 climbed to 194. Table 1 presents the data, organized by month.⁷

In response to the rapid rise in the number of junks arriving in Japan in 1687, the government began restricting the number of trading vessels allowed to visit ports, so that only 70 junks came to Nagasaki in 1689, and 80 junks came in 1698. From 1709 the number of trading vessels visiting the port was restricted to 59.

The main products transported by Chinese junks from Japan to China were Japanese copper and marine delicacies. From the beginning of the Edo era, the Qing court began actively purchasing Japanese copper. As China's monetary economy developed, there developed a shortage of silver sycee (ingots) and copper cash in circulation. Throughout the Kangxi period (1662–1722), the Chinese relied on Japan as an important source of copper for minting copper coins, a need that resulted in the arrival of many Chinese merchants in Nagasaki. Japan became a major source of supply of these metals. Copper was also produced in the Yunnan region of China, but in 1716 the amount of copper supplied to the Qing court from Yunnan was only 1,663,000 catties (993 metric tons), versus approximately 2,772,000 catties (1,654 metric tons) from Japan. In other words, Japanese copper contributed a significant 62.5 percent of the total amount of copper used to supply the Qing dynasty's monetary economy.⁸

Japanese copper production decreased after the eighteenth century, however, and the amount of copper supplied to China fell correspondingly. China next sought Japan's marine products, such as dried abalone (*baoyu* 鮑魚 or *fuyu* 鰻魚 in Chinese), sea cucumber, and shark's fin (*shayu* 鯊魚 or *yuchi* 魚翅 in Chinese).⁹ These items were used in Chinese cooking to give a unique flavor to dishes. Dried abalone and shark's fin were major ingredients in seafood dishes in China during the Qing era, when such dishes began to grow in popularity even among the common people. Dried sea cucumber, literally, ocean ginseng (*haishen* 海參), was also highly prized for its medicinal value, and imports from Japan rivaled that grown in China. Dried marine products thus developed into a major trade commodity between the two countries as Japan became an important source of supply, perhaps indicating a significant impact of Japanese foodstuffs on Chinese folk culinary traditions.¹⁰

7 Matsuura Akira, *Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū* (Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era), p. 248.

8 Matsuura Akira, *Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū*, p. 111.

9 See Matsuura Akira, *Shindai kaigai bōeki shi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of Foreign Trade in the Qing Era).

10 Matsuura Akira, *Shindai kaigai bōeki shi no kenkyū*, pp. 382–402.

In Japan as well, increased production of these three products—dried sea cucumber, dried abalone, and shark’s fin, collectively called *tawaramono* or *hyōmotsu* (俵物 goods in straw bags)—was actively promoted. At the beginning of the Guangxu years (1875–1908), He Ruzhang, appointed as plenipotentiary to Japan, wrote in his *Shidong zaji* (Miscellany of an Envoy to Japan), “Many Chinese merchants take raw cotton and white sugar, and return with various marine products such as sea cucumbers and dried abalone.”¹¹ He Ruzhang’s note clearly underscores the importance of these products in China even after the Edo era.

In 1715 the Japanese government promulgated the Shōtoku Shinrei (正徳新令 New Edict of the Shōtoku Period), which restricted the outflow of gold, silver, and copper through the Nagasaki trade. Until this time the main constraint on trade was on the number of junks allowed to trade at Nagasaki. The Shōtoku Shinrei newly allowed the issuing of trading licenses (*shinpai* 信牌), mainly to junks docking at Nagasaki. After promulgation of the edict on sea trade, possession of a trading license, granted by the Japanese government to conduct trade in Nagasaki, became required for trade. If the captain of a Chinese ship did not have this license, the ship was not allowed to dock in Nagasaki the next time it sailed to Japan. Further, any Chinese captain or merchant caught violating this law was not given a second chance to obtain a license, so it was impossible for that person ever to come to Japan again. This system ensured that junks coming to Nagasaki without a license could not engage in trade thereafter. Licenses thus constituted a limitation on trade as well as a system for designating merchants.

Subsequently, the policy was gradually tightened. In 1717, 40 junks were allowed to enter the port of Nagasaki; in 1765, 13 junks were permitted to dock; and in 1791 only 10 junks were allowed, a situation that continued until the end of the Tokugawa era.

After promulgation of the Shōtoku Shinrei, junks entering the port of Nagasaki were mainly restricted to those from the Jiangnan delta region of China, immediately south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, as I will discuss shortly. “Kairo, sara ni kazu, narabi ni kokin Karakuni-watari minato no setsu”(Explanation of Shipping Routes and Numbers, as well as Ports Old and New in Crossing Over to China) states,

In that era, there were two convenient ports: Shanghai and Zhapu. All of the junks would travel back and forth to, and congregate in, these two ports to conduct trade. These two ports, however, restricted their trade to

11 He Ruzhang, *Shidong zaji* (Miscellany of an Envoy in Japan), *Xiaofanghu-zhai yudi congshao* (Geographical Essays from the Xiaofanghu Studio), slip case 10.

textiles, various medicines, low-quality goods, and a variety of containers and tools produced in several places. Several hundreds of traders would bring goods, whereupon merchants from Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Fujian would check the silver purchasing price and ship the goods from these two ports. Even if there are junks sailing over from Ningbo, Zhoushan, Putuoshan, Fuzhou, Amoy, and Guangdong, most of the junks come from Shanghai and Zhapu.¹²

From the above we can conclude that the most important ports for conducting trade via Chinese junks with Japan were Shanghai and Zhapu.

Zhapu was closely guarded as an area that required defending. Volume 72 of *Shizong shilu* (世宗實錄 Authentic Account of the Yongzheng Emperor), for the seventeenth day of the eighth month of 1728, has the entry “It is known that there is an area called Zhapu in Pinghu County. It is an eminent seaport for Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Trade from Zhapu reaches the countries across the sea. Moreover, it is only a little over 200 *li* [approximately 129 kilometers] from Hangzhou.” In a report to the emperor dated the sixth day of the first month of 1730, the provincial governor of Zhejiang, Liwei, noted, “Zhapu is an important port for conducting marine trade with Japan in the East.”¹³ Zhapu continued to maintain its position as a major trading port with Japan until well into the middle of the nineteenth century. In the mid-nineteenth century, the British said of Zhapu, “Chapoo, on the Gulf of Hangchow, owes all its commercial importance to the exclusive trade which it enjoys with Japan, monopolized by six imperial junks.”¹⁴

Why did Zhapu receive such attention? One of the most important reasons was that Suzhou was in its hinterland. In the Qing era, Suzhou was an important hub for Chinese commerce. Hence, the Jiangnan delta region was a convenient location for collecting together fine silks and other handicrafts ideal for shipping, as well as for selling products imported from Japan.¹⁵ The geographic location of Zhapu fostered a close relationship with the major commercial center of Suzhou. In addition, situated on the coast of the conti-

12 *Nagasaki bunken sōsho* (Nagasaki Document Series), series 1, vol. 2, *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei seihen* (Principal Compilation of an Authentic Account of Nagasaki), p. 241.

13 *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zuozhe* (Inner Palace Files Reported to the Yongzheng Court), compilation no. 15 (January 1979), p. 424.

14 Thomas Allom and G. N. Wright, *China, in a Series of Views: Displaying the Scenery, Architecture, and Social Habits of That Ancient Empire* (1843), vol. 3, p. 49.

15 Matsuura Akira, *Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of Foreign Trade in the Qing Era), pp. 382–402.

ment, Zhapu was a port of call for coastal trading ships from Fujian and Guangdong in China's southeastern region. Sugar, for example, which was produced along China's southeastern coastal region, was transported by coastal sailing ships to Zhapu, transferred to trading ships heading for Japan, and then taken to Nagasaki. Of the goods transported by Chinese junks to Nagasaki, sugar produced in southeastern China was important as an inexpensive cargo.

Changes in Qing political policies and in Tokugawa trading policies greatly influenced trends in Chinese trade in Nagasaki. Economic exchange was the focus of Sino-Japanese relations during the Edo period, but that focus was profoundly influenced by political policies of the Qing court and the Tokugawa bakufu.¹⁶

Sino-Japanese Cultural and Scholarly Interaction

The nearly constant Chinese trade that occurred in Nagasaki throughout the Edo era provided a basis for the cultural interaction that occurred between Japan and China in the premodern era. It is well known that Japan was the recipient of Chinese learning, but the role of captains of junks in this transmission of culture has not been widely explored.

Beginning in the first half of the eighteenth century, Chinese merchants who engaged in trade with Japan were organized mainly into shippers (*caidong* 財東), captains of ships visiting Nagasaki (*chuanzhu* 船主), boat owners (*chuanhu* 船戶), and crew (*huozhang* 夥長, *zongguan* 總管, *shuishou* 水手, etc). The central figure in Nagasaki trade among Chinese merchants was the captain (*sentō* 船頭 in Japanese).¹⁷

During the early stages of Nagasaki trading, a portion of the district called Yadochō was designated for the Chinese to lodge, but after a variety of problems arose with the arrangement, a separate foreign settlement known as Chinese residences (Tōkan 唐館 or Tōjin yashiki 唐人屋敷) was built in 1689, and Chinese coming by sea to Nagasaki were ordered to stay in the housing provided there. This was the case until 1868, when the residences began to be dismantled.

Among the Chinese captains who had been sailing to Nagasaki for a long time were intellectuals, with whom Japanese men of letters sought to interact. One such person was Wang Shengwu, who first introduced to Japan the *Gujin*

16 Matsuura Akira, "Shinchō Chūgoku to Nihon" (Qing China and Japan), chapter 2 of *Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū* (Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era).

17 Matsuura Akira, *Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of Foreign Trade in the Qing Era), pp. 73–90.

tushu jicheng (古今圖書集成 Collection of Illustrations and Writings Past and Present). In the Edo era Nagasaki became a desirable location for Japanese men of letters who sought out Chinese scholar-merchants. For example, the geographer Nagakubo Sekisui (1717–1801), from Mito, interacted with the shipping merchant Ming Heqi, as depicted in Nagakubo's *Shinsa shōwashū* (清槎唱和集 Collection of Qing Raft Call and Response Songs) (see illustration). In addition to these cases, Shiba Kōkan (1747–1818), a famous Japanese painter and printmaker, met the Chinese merchant Tian Mingqi.¹⁸

Some of the individuals who came from China to Nagasaki as traders sought documents that had already been lost in China, the best example being Wang Peng (Wang Zhuli). Wang Peng came to Japan to look for the lost book, *Guwen xiaojing* (古文孝經 Classic of Filial Piety in the Ancient Style). After locating the book, he took it back with him to China, and it was later reprinted by Bao Yanbo in his *Zhibuzu-zhai congshu* (知不足齋叢書 Collected Reprints from the Studio of Insufficient Knowledge). Even now it is possible to find the name of Wang Peng in the preface of the *Guwen xiaojing*.¹⁹ Since Wang Peng used the alternate name of Wang Zhuli when he came to Nagasaki as a merchant, little attention was paid to his presence. If his name had been recorded in the trade annals under Wang Peng, he would not have been overlooked until just recently. Since Wang Peng was restricted during his sojourn in Japan to the Chinese residence in Nagasaki, in all probability he was compelled to retrieve the lost document by securing the cooperation of Japanese merchants. His contributions to the development of scholarship at the Qing court are all the more impressive considering the lengths to which he was driven to recover the *Guwen xiaojing*.

A well-known merchant-scholar who came to Japan to take back documents pertaining to China is Yang Shoujing (1839–1915), a wealthy Chinese merchant's son who became famous as a calligrapher, epigraphist, geographer, and bibliophile. Less well known is that Yang Shoujing was preceded by over a century by a merchant-scholar with the same intentions.

Other Chinese intellectuals who sailed to Japan included men of science. On a plaque in the Mazu Shrine at Sōfukuji Temple in Nagasaki, for example, is engraved the name of Yang Sixiong (Yang Xiting), a medical doctor.²⁰

18 Matsuura Akira, *Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū* (Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era), chap. 3, “Chūgoku shōnin to Nihon” (Chinese Merchants and Japan).

19 Matsuura Akira, *Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū* (Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era), pp. 202–216.

20 Matsuura Akira, *Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of Foreign Trade in the Qing Era), pp. 247–251.

Sino-Japanese cultural interactions during the Edo era were not limited to trade. Unexpected relationships arose when storms at sea caused shipwrecks and the problem of castaways. Examples of castaways in China during the Edo era have already been enumerated by the Japanese scholar Sōda Hiroshi.²¹ Records of some Edo-era castaways remain even now in the possession of established families. There are also examples of classical Chinese poems sent by Chinese to Japanese castaways embellishing Japanese sliding paper doors (*fusuma*) in their family homes.²²

Premodern Sino-Japanese relations were also influenced by world events. In particular, when the Tokugawa bakufu abandoned its policy of isolation, Japanese began actively going abroad. The bakufu dispatched official ships to Shanghai with the intention of expanding trade. The first such ship, which left Nagasaki for Shanghai in April 1862, was the *Senzai-maru*. Takasugi Shinsaku and Godai Tomoatsu were aboard, and they brought back to Japan stories of a prospering Shanghai and of Qing China.

During the period when they were traveling to Shanghai, a newspaper written in literary Chinese and called the *Shanghai xinbao* was being published in the city. The first issue of the newspaper was published in November 1860 in Shanghai by the British merchant newspaper company *Zilin yanghang* (字林洋行). Most of the articles were translated from foreign newspapers, but there were also extremely useful stories carried in the paper concerning the Taiping Rebellion, the large-scale revolt that lasted from 1850 to 1864 and affected significant portions of southern China. The *Shanghai xinbao* also carried information on the crew of the *Senzai-maru* and their stay in Shanghai from the beginning of June 1862 through the end of July.

Another influential newspaper published in Shanghai at the time, the *North-China Herald*, wrote in its issue for July 7, 1861 (no. 619),

The arrival at the port of Shanghai, during the past few days, of a British-built vessel sailing under the Japanese flag is in itself an event worthy of notice. When we learn further that this ship has not only been purchased by the native [Japanese] government, but that she is laden with the produce and manufactures of the country for trading purposes abroad, it throws an entirely new light upon the exclusive policy of that peculiar people. Hitherto we have been led to understand that the Tycoon and his Yaonins, and the Damios who rule with despotic sway over the subjects of the empire, were not only averse to the encourage-

21 Sōda Hiroshi, “Kinsei hyōyūmin to Chūgoku”(Castaways in the Premodern Era and China).

22 Matsuura Akira, *Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū* (Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Era), chap. 3, pp. 301–324.

ment of foreign commerce, but held in contempt those who pursued the vocations of merchants and ship-traders.²³

This quote indicates the strong interest in the *Senzai-maru* when it docked in Shanghai. Mention of the sailing of the *Senzai-maru* informed Westerners residing in Asia that the Tokugawa bakufu was abandoning its policy of seclusion and opening Japan to foreign trade. This new development in Japan was of major interest to Westerners in Asia.

The Taipings greatly influenced the Nagasaki trade when they were expanding their power on the Chinese mainland in the mid-1800s. The Taiping Rebellion devastated the economy of Jiangnan, the base of Chinese merchants who traded with Nagasaki. Subsequently, it became difficult to continue trade via Chinese junks to Nagasaki. Some Chinese merchants tried to maintain trade by even chartering British ships. Other Chinese merchants were compelled to resort to making a living by residing in Japan.

Mutual political influence on trade is apparent in the relationship between the two countries. From the Japanese perspective, the Nagasaki trade conducted by Chinese merchants was not merely an economic exchange; it was also a cultural and scholarly interaction that became an important foundation for Japan's modernization from the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

Toward the end of the Qing era, the nature of Chinese trading in Nagasaki changed greatly with shifting world trends. First, the Taipings' attack on Zhapu, which had served as a base for trade between Nagasaki and Suzhou, caused the merchants' trade organization and arrangements to collapse. Later, when Japan opened up to the world after years of isolation, fast new clipper ships and steamships from the West began frequenting Japanese ports for trade in great numbers. As a result, Chinese junks quickly lost their competitiveness in the new international setting.

Sino-Japanese cultural and intellectual interchange during the Edo era was a unique interlude in world history, one that depended on the efforts of Chinese shipping merchants, whose junks dominated marine transportation in Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The relationship also depended on the Tokugawa bakufu's adoption of a national policy of isolation, which prohibited Japanese ships from sailing abroad. A remarkable cultural exchange resulted from this unique state of affairs.

23 Mainichi Komyunikēshonzu, *Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nihon* (Japan As Seen in Foreign Newspapers), vol. 1, 1851–1873, p. 186.

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Figure 1. A Chinese junk, from *Tōkan-zu Rankan-zu emaki* (Picture Scroll of the Chinese and Dutch Residences), painted by Ishizaki Yūshi



Figure 2. Illustration of a Chinese junk entering Tsu Harbor, Nagasaki wood-block print (Nagasaki Tamatoya Print)



Figure 3. Scene inside the Chinese residential area, from *Tōkan-zu Rankan-zu emaki* (Picture Scroll of the Chinese and Dutch Residences), painted by Ishizaki Yūshi



Figure 4. Illustration of Chinese in *Shinsa shōwashū* (Collection of Qing Raft Call and Response Songs)



Figure 5. Dried sea cucumber
(*haishen*)